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ABSTRACT
This paper contrasts the differing experience ofpublic sector unionism,
which has expanded in the United States, andprivate sector unionism,
which has contracted, in the past several decades.It uses the experi-
ence of other countries, particularly Canada, to rule outsome explana-
tions of the divergent trends. Thepaper finds that the major reason
for the private sector decline is increasedmanagement Opposition to
union organization, motivated in part byprofit-seeking behavior, and
augmented by trade union responses; and that the majorreason for the
public sector union expansion is decreased marketopposition due to pas-






The institutionalstructure of the American labormarket changed
remarkably from the l950s and 1960sto the l980s. In the '50s and'60s
trade Unions seemedpermanently established in the privatesector of the
economy: a third of nonagricultural
wage and salary workers, and over half
of blue-collar workers,
were union members; hundreds ofthousands of
workers voted annually inNational Labor Relations Board(NLRB)
representation elections to joinunions; most large firms soughtstable
collective bargaining relationswith their Unions. Bycontrast, in the
public sector only 10-12percent of workers were union members;fewer were
covered by collectivebargaining contracts; and mostexperts regarded
public employees asintrinsically nonorganizable.According to AFL-CIO
president George Meany, itwas "impossible to bargaincollectively with the
government.
The massive contractionof unionism in the privatesector and
expansion in the public sector inthe l970s and l980s (see Exhibit1) has
produced an utterly differentsituation today. In the privatesector, the
proportion of wage and salary workersin unions plummeted to 14percent in
1986 -.alevel comparable to that inthe Great Depression;only a
minuscule number of workers
joined unions through NLRB elections;and
national companiesopenly proclaimed their intentto establish a
"union-free environment ftycontrast, in the public sector over a third of
the work force was unionized
some 40 percent were covered by collective
contracts;2 andpublic sector unions such as theAmerican Federation of
State, County and MunicipalEmployees, National Education Association,EXHIBJLI: Changing Percentof Non_Agricultural






















Sources: Percentage ofWorkers in Unions and Assoc.in Public Sector,
(BLS) U.S. Dept of Labor,1979.
Percentage of Workers inUnions and Pssoc. in Public Sector,
(cP5) U.S. Bureau of Census,1973-1.984, (1982 not available).
Percentage of Workers inUnion in Private Sector1956-1.982,
Troy, Leo and NeilSheflin, Union Sourcebook.
Private Sector 1984-86 from CPS,U.S. Dept. of Labor, Employ-







Service Employees International,(which became largely publicsector in the
period), and the American Federationof Teachers wereamong the largest in
the country. With one in threeunion members working in thepublic sector,
women with master's degrees
(largely schoolteachers) morehighly organized
than male high schoolgraduates, and police and firefightersthe exemplars
of craft unionism, the union
movement differed drastically from thatheaded
by Meany in the l9GOs.
Becausethe privatesectoremploysnearly 85 percent of
nonagricultural wage and salary workersin the United States,3the
contraction of Unionization in theprivate sector dominates the trendsfor
the economy as a whole,with the result that the unionproportion of
nonagrjcultur employees fell from 36percent in 1956 to 18 percent in
1986. This decline in union
density was larger than that of thel920s, and
thus arguably represents themost significant change in labormarket
institutions since the Depression-- theeffective de-unionization ofmost
of the U.S. labor force.
What explains the decline inunion representation of privatewage and
salary workers? Why have unionsexpanded in the public sector while
contracting in the private sector? Is theeconomy-wide fall in density a
phenomenon common to developed
capitalist economies, or is itunique to the
United States? To whatextent should economists alter theirviews about
what unions do to theeconomy in light of the fact that they
increasingly
do it in the publicsector?
To answer these questions Iexamine a wide variety of evidenceon the
union status of public andprivate workers. I contrast trendsin
unionization in the United Stateswith trends in other developedcountries,
Particularly Canada, and use thesecontrasts amid the divergence between-3-
unions in the public and private
sectors of the United Statesto evaluate
proposed explanations.
Because standard economic theoryis not normally used to analyse
massive changes in the
institutional structure of an economy, many may
think that an explanation of changingunion density requires extensive
reliance on social factors that gobeyond economics. I arguethat this is
not the case and base my analysison economic forces andbehavior. The
complexity of institutional changedoes, however, dictate acatholic
analytic approach; and I useseveral lines of argument and evidencerather
than a single econometric model or hypothesis
test to reach conclusions; in
addition, I recognize that a significant
residual remains that can and
perhaps should be attributedto 'non-economic' factorssuch as the
abilities of union leaders, public opinion,and the like.
I. The Dimensions of Change
"It is a capital mistake to theorize
in advance of the facts."
Arthur Conan Doyle, recording thewords of S. Holmes.
Three firmobservationscan be made about the changein union density
in the United States: first,that the decline in density inthe private
sector has been virtually ubiquitous,
encompassing workers in all
industries,regions, and occupations duringthe 1980s and earlier; second,
that by contrast uniofl expansionin the publicsector has been highly
uneven,occurring rapidly in some statesand occupations but not in others;
andthird, that the overall drop inunion density -- thede-unionization of
theeconomy
--isdistinctly American,contrasting sharply with
developmentsin most Western countries.
Exhibit2 documents the claim that uniondensity has fallen among--
EXHIbIT2: Percentage of PrivateWage and Salary Workers Who











Professional Tech & Kindred 23 19
Mangers and Administrators 8 7
Clerical and Kindred 16 14
Sales 4 6
Craft and Kindred 39 29
Operatives, except Transport 40 33
Transport & Equipment 45 31
Non—farm Laborers 33 25
Service workers, except
Protective Service* 13 10
*Protectjve Service excluded becausethey are largely in the public sector.
Occupations based on 1980 titles with 1985estImates for:
Professional, Tech & KindredProfessjonal Specialty+Techand
related support, weightedby employemnt
Managers & AdmjnjstrationExecutjve administrator andmanagers Clerical & Kindredprecjsjonproduction, craft & repair
Operatives, except transport=Machjneoperators, assemblers &
inspectors
Transport Equipment=transporj0 & materialmoving occupations Non—farm laborers handlers,equipment cleaners, helpers & laborers
Source: U.S. Department ofLabor, 1980 arid 1987—5—
virtually all workers during thel980s when the rate of decline was
exceptionally severe. The industry figuresshow the union proportion of
workers falling in areasof traditional union strengthsuch as
transportation and public utilities (includingtrucking which the Teamsters
once dominated); construction (longthe preserve of craft unions); and
manufacturing (where industrial unionshave held sway since the organizing
drives of the 1930s and j.940s); aswell as in services and trade where
proportions organized were solow that even a modicum of union success
would raise the union shares.The occupation data (which understate
declines in private sector density because theyinclude public sector
labor) reveal a similar trend,with sizeable drops in density among
operatives, craft workers, andlaborers.As for the longer run, the
percentage of productionworkers in metropolitan areas with collective
bargaining contracts fell from 73% in1960-61 to 51% in 1984, with massive
declines in every region of the country rangingfrom -16 points in the
South (48 percent to 32 percent) to -32 pointsin the West (80 percent to
48 percent, Goldfield, 1987).These declines show that much more is
involved in the contraction of union densityin the private sector than
changes in the regional mix or productionworker share of employment.
Overall, the data indicate that an explanationof the decline in
private sector union density shouldfocus on factors that affect all
private employees as opposed to factorsthat affect employees in some
segments of the labor market ratherthan others.
The Rise in Public Sector Union Density
Measuring changes in unionism in the U.S. publicsector is difficult.
One difficulty is that each American state (andthe federal government)
regulates public sector labor in its ownjurisdictions producing labor—6—
organizatio with different legalrights. Whereas in the private sector
union membership, collectivebargaining representation, and theright to
strike are coterminus under thesame legal code, in the public sectora
worker can be a union member butnot be covered by a collectivecontract in
some states (becausemanagement can refuse to bargain or tosign an
agreement with a union) while being coveredin others; be coveredby a
contract that does not includewages and salaries, as in federal
employment; be allowed to strike insome jurisdictions but obligatedto
resolve disputes through arbitrationelsewhere, and so Ofl. Historically,
moreover, public sector worker organizations
have ranged from associations
opposed to collective bargaining to
aggressive unions, with the
same organization serving as a unionin some localities but not inothers
(the American Association ofUniversity Professors is a case inpoint).
Indicative of the measurement
problem, the figures on public sectordensity
in exhibit 1 show discontinuitieswhen the relevantsurveys first included
'associations' with unions in theirdefinition of collectiveorganisation.
While it might seemmisleading to compare union membership inearly years
with union plus association
membership in later years, this comparison does
in fact accurately
measure the magnitude (though not thetiming) of change.
This is because in the l950sand early 1960s most associations-- for
instance the NEA or the variouspolice and firefighters organisations- -
didnot engage in collectivebargaining, often rejecting itas
'unprofessional' wheras in the l980sthey embraced bargaining and the other
attributes of traditional tradeunions.
A final complexity is that thelegal environment under which public
sector unions operate haschanged over time. From the 1960s through the
early l970s, when public sector workersjoined unions or saw their associa-—7—
tions turn into unions, most public sectorlabor laws did not require
employers to bargain/resolve impasses
and outlawed the strike weapon that
unions use to force employers to come to agreement.As a result many
workers who joined unions did not workunder collectively bargained
contracts. By contrast, from the mid-l970s tothe 1980s more and more union
workers (and nonunion workers in organizedworkplaces) were able to gain
contracts from their employers (35 percentof state and local government
workers were covered in 1982 compared to26 percent inl975). At the same
time that contract coverage was increasing,however, the proportion of
public sector workers in unionsstabilized or fell. In this case,
statistics on membership and coveragetell different stories about the
trend in union strength. As collective bargaining
resulting in a contract
has been the essence of American unionactivity, I stress increased
contract coverage rather than membershiptrends in assessing the l980s.
Given differences in state regulationsof public sector collective
bargaining it is perhaps not surprising tofind that the extent and, by
extension, expansion of bargaining has varied acrossstates and among
occupations.(Exhiblt3). In states with laws favorable to collective
bargaining (arbitration or strike permittedlaws, and duty to bargain),
proportionately more workers are represented bybargaining units than in
states that permit but do not require employersto bargain while
representation by unions is low in statesthat have no collective
bargaining provisions and lowest in thosethat prohibit bargaining.
Though these data relate to cross-sectiondifferences at a point in time
rather than changes over time, we can infer patternsof growth from them.
We can do this because contract coverage wassufficiently slight in the
earlier period that states/occupations with highdensity in the l980s—8—
Exhibit 3: Qographic Varlaatlonin percentage o Employees
presented by arga2n1ngUn
y Occupation and State Law, 198
State Laws ro Most * o4 States with Given LaborLaw avorao1e to Least
eeployee represented bybagapjng Favorable to
unit)1 byOccupation:
_____ Fire Sanitàtj, Street
rbitratior or Strje
Fermizte 15 t947.) 18 947.) i (9) 1C49)
Duty to Bargain 12 58ii(62Z) ii 14) 11 71.1
Bargainar,g Permitted 11 45) 13 54Z) 12 23X) 12 (19X)
No royia S 5 (3O/j 9 (27) 9 (44Z)
Bara1n1nQPrDrbited 4'1X) 3 (ISZ} 5 ( 8) 1X)
Scurces: U.S.Bureau of the Census. Survey of5cvernmentc1932 BER State PublicSector CollectveBarcair,irgLaw Data Set.—9—
almost always had rapid growth
whereas those in which densitywas low could
not have had such growth.
Interpreted in this way, theexhibit shows the
uneven expansion of unionrepresent8ti0fl with proportionately
more workers gaining representation
in states (and occupations)having laws
favorable to collective bargainingthan in other states.
The evidence on geographic divergence
implies that an explanationof
union growth in the public sectormust have a geographicdimension related
to state laws as opposed tothe tacrossthe.boards' explanation
that seems
appropriate for the privatesector.
Cross -Country Contrasts
Pecause the meaning and measurement
of union membership differs across
countries, the figures in Exhibit4 should be regarded as crudeindicators
of degrees of unionization. Evenread cautiously, however, theyclearly
contradict the notion that thedecline in union density inthe United
States is part of a general collapse
of unions in the developedworld: in
most countries union densityincreased in the l970s andstabilized or
declined modestly in the 1980s atlevels above those in earlier years.In
Japan, where density fellin both decades, the rateof decline was half as
large as in the United States,and less significant in termsof the entire
work force because the proportionof Japanese working asnonagricUlt1l
wage and salary workers
increased, maintaining the unionshare of total
employment. In Canada, where manyof the same companies andunions operate
as in the United Statesand where living standardsand culture (exclusive
of Quebec) are similar, union densitywent from roughly the sameto twice
the U.S. level from 1970 to 1985.A persuasive explanationof the decline
in union density in the UnitedStates should also explain whydensity did
not decline in Canada in the sametime period.- 10—
Exhibit4: Levels and Changes in Union Density
Across Countries 1970-85
Countries with Sharp
Rises in Density 1970 1979 1984/5 1970-79 1979-85
Denmark 66 86 98 +20 +12 Finland 56 84 85 +28 +1 Sweden 79 89 95 +10 +12
Belgium 66 77 +11
Countries with Moderate
Rises in Density
Italy (?) 39 51 45 +12 -6
Germany 37 42 42 +5 0
France (?) 22 28 28 +6 0 Switzerland 31 36 35 +5 -1 Canada 32 36 37 +4 +1 Australia 52 58 57 +6 -1 New Zealand 43 46 ? +3
Ireland 44 49 51 +5 +2
Countries with Stable/
Decline Density
Norway 59 60 61 +1 +1
United Kingdom 51 58 52 +7 -6 Austria * 64 59 61 -5 +2 Japan * 35 32 29 -3 -3 Netherlands 39 43 37 +4 -6 United States 31 25 18 -6 -7
*NoChange in share of total employment due to fall inagriculture employment.
Note: Union Density as a percent of nonagriculturalwage and salary employees.
Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of LaborStatistics, Office of
Productivity and Technology, Division of Foreign Labor Statistics andTrade,
July 1986.
Center for Labour Economics OECD Data Set.
Respective Country Statistical Abstracts.— 11—
Athird country to which I would like to draw attention is the United
Kingdom, where density fell in the 1980s, probablyat rates above those
shown in the Exhibit (the union figures comefrom theunions,who exaggerate
membership in a period of decline); where organizationin the strongest
union structure, the closed shop (which requires workers tobe union), fell
sharply; where an increasing proportionof private manufacturing firms
operated nonunion; where employment grew more rapidlyin low-union density
than in high-union density plants; and where proportionscovered by
collective contracts also fellnoticeably.5 Because density increased in
the 1970s in the United Kingdom, however, these changeshave not produced
anything like an American-style drop through1985.
Overall, the patterns of change shown inExhibit 4 highlight the fact.
that dc-unionization is •largely, if not exclusively, aU.S. development.6
This fact has important implications. First, it disallows anybroad
explanation of the decline of the form, say,that "unions have become
obsolete in the modern 'post-industrial' market economy" (whateverthose
grandiose terms mean). Second, it constitutes powerfulevidence against the
structuralist argument that changes in the composition of thework force
and jobs from (traditionally union) male blue collarlabor to
(traditionally nonunion) female, white collar, and servicelabor underlie
the drop. If "post-industrial" •or structural changes inexorablyreduce
unionization, density would have fallen in Canada andother developed
capitalist countries, all of whom have experiencedessentially the same
structural changes as the United States, as well as in theUnited States.
Finally, the divergent country trends also castdoubt on any general
macro-economic explanation of U.S. de-unionizatiOfl it is hard to argue
that the economic problems that followed the oil shock,the inflation of— 12—
thel970s, or ensuing deflation caused unions to decline in theU.S. when
the same forces did not reduce uniondensity elsewhere. Put differently,
the international data direct attentionaway from worldwide economic
developments to the particulars of American labor relations.
II. How American Workers Organize
"No. no! The adventures first." said theGryphoninan impatient tone:
"explanations take such a dreadful time." --LewisCarro].].
Before evaluating proposed explanations for thechange in union
density in the U.S. it is important to understand theway in which workers
are organized. In contrast to some countries suchas the United Kingdom
where unionization is left largely toprivate parties, state governments in
the United States regulateextensively the process of union representation
in both private and public sectors.
The National Labor-Management Relations Act(NLRA) of 1935, amended in
1947(Taft-Hartley Act) and afterwards, establishes secret ballot
representation elections for private sector workers to choose whetheror
not to become union and regulates the labor relationsconduct of employers
and unions in several ways. The Act forbidsemployers to discriminate
against workers for union activity and forbids unions toengage in certain
tactics deemed unfair as well, such assecondary boycotts.
'Underthe
National Labor Relations Boardprocess, unionization currently takes the
following form: a union petitions for an electionby producing the
signatures of 30 percent or more (in practice a union willpetition for an
election only if two-thirds of so theemployees are willing to request an— 13—
election.The NLRB decides the set ofworkers eligible to vote, nd,
subject to legal objectionsand appeals that can delay theactual election
for several months, supervises the voting.
If a majority votes for the
union the NLRB will certify it asthe collective bargaining representative
of the work force, which obligatesthe employer to bargain, though not to
come to agreement. To resolve impassesworkers can strike while employers
can lockout employees or
hire strikebreakers. The NLRB alsosupervises
secret-ballot "decertificatiOn" elections
for unionized workers who wish to
reconsider their status.
The key to understanding the processis to recognize that although
only workers vote in a representationelection, management plays an active
role in most campaigns, generally tryingto convince workers to reject
unions. One study of some 200 organizing campaignsin 1982-83, for example,
estimated that the direct supervisorsof workers played a "sizeable" or
"extreme" role in two-thirds of the elections,while abstaining in just 6
percent (AFL-CIO, Appendix, p.37). Manymanagements employ labor-management
consulting experts ("union-busters") to
convince workers to vote against
the union. Determining union status throughan adversarial election
framework which accords management a majorrole is a distinctly American
process which has contributed,I will argue, to the observeddecline of
private sector union density.
The fact that each state has its own publicsector labor law means
that there is no uniform method bywhich workers unionize in the public
sector. Indeed, while some states enacted NLRA-typelaws that create
secret ballot election procedures forworkers to decide union status and
that require employers to negotiatewith the unions, often mandating
compulsory arbitration to resolve disputes,other states outlaw unions or— 14—
collectivebargaining.8 Because state laws often mimic theNLRA, however,
the situation is not as chaotic as might firstappear. A reasonable
generalization is that in states with comprehensive public sector labor
laws, the de jure process of unionization in the public sector is muchlike
that in the private sector, with workers deciding unionstatus through
government sponsored voting procedures. As the method for unionization is
comparable between the public and private sectors, an explanation of
divergent sectorial trends must explain why comparableprocesses produce
different outcomes in the two sectors.
U.S. labor law establishes representation elections for workersto
choose union status but does not outlaw privateagreements between workers
and management regarding unionization. Unions andemployers can agree that
a given workplace will be organized (as GM, Toyota, and UAW have done for
the Fremont, California plant) with anunderstanding that if the workers or
another union seek an election, management will remain neutralor encourage
workers to choose the preferred union. Unions can alsosign up workers and
demand recognition, threatening a strike shouldmanagement refuse. In some
sectors, moreover, employers are union because they hire from unionhiring
halls. While non-NLR& modes of organizationare likely to become more
important in the future, representation elections have been thepredominant
mode of organization in the past thirtyyears, making the outcome of the
election process critical to union growth in the period understudy.
Relating New Organization to Density
The discussion thus far has dealt with theprocess by which workers
choose to unionize and hence with the flow ofnew union members. As our
ultimate concern is with changes in union density it is essentialto relate— 15—
theflows to the "stock" of union members.The following identity, which
makes total union membership a functionof the changes in existing
membership and of "investment" through organizingactivity, relates the
flows to the stocks:
UNION(t) —IINION(t-l)
-rUNION(t-l) + NEW(t)
UNION is the number of union members (personscovered by collective
bargaining contracts) in a given year t.
r is the rate of change in membershipdue to changes in employment in
organized establishments. The "natural" processby which some union plants
close yearly while new plants are born nonunion suggeststhat r will be be
positive, implying a natural depreciationin union membership, even in a
growing economy.
NEW is the number of new members obtained throughorganization of new
workplaces or lost through decertificatiOnof unions at existing workplaces
in the period from t-l to t. For reasons of dataavailability NEW is best
thought of as net members gained throughNLRB elections, though in
principal one would like to include theresult of all new organizing
activity.
Dividing both sides of the identity bythe number of employees in year
t to measure union density (UDENS), and manipulating,we obtain:
UDENS(t) —[l/(l÷g)fl(l-r)UDENS(t-l) + PCTNEW(t))
l-r-g) UDENS(t-l) + (l-g) PCTNEW(t)
where PCTNEW is the ratio of workers organized tothe work force in t-l;— 16—
gis the rate of growth of total employment;
-(r+g) is the net depreciation or appreciation of union density
The steady state level of union density impliedby this difference
equation is:
UDENS—PCTNEW/(r+g)
which shows that the permanant level of union densitychanges whenever
r+g or PCTNEW change; that is, whenever economic conditions cause union
plants to contract/expand relative to the growth of total employmentor
when the rate of union organization changes over time.For example, if
unions organize 1% of the work forceper annum, as they did in the 1950s,
and suffer a net depreciation of density of 4%, the union shareof
employment would stabilize at 25%.If, alternatively, new organization
fell to .7% of the work force, as it did in the 1960s, andr+g remained the
same, the union share would drop to 17.5% in the long run.
How important are changes in new organization versuschanges in the
rate of depreciation of existing union membership in the recentcollapse of
private sector union density? Crude calculations applying our difference
equation to private sector union membership and number of workers won
through NLRB elections show a rising trend the depreciation rate in recent
years: estimated compound annual rates of r+g for the l950s of 4.0 percent;
for the 1960s, 3.4 percent; for the l970s, 4.7percent; and for 1980-85,
6.1 percent.9 Two factors are likely to underlie the incease inr+g in the
1970s and l980s: the concentration of unionism inslow-growth areas and
potential increased death of union plants due to the rising unionwage
premiums of the seventies. The crudeness of the data underlying the
estimates of r+g makes one leery, however, of taking estimatedchanges too
seriously. What should be taken serious is the negative value of -(r+g),— 17—
whichimplies that unions, like the Red Queen in Throughthe Looking Glass
for whom "it takes all the running you can do, to keep inthe same place,"
must organize large numbers of workers each year tomaintain private sector
density.
That unions have failed to do this through the NLRS electoral process
is evident from the statistics summarized in Exhibit5. Columns 1 and 2
measure the success of unions in organizingworkers through NLRB
representation elections in selected years from1950 to 1983: column 1
gives the absolute number of workers won byunions in representation
elections while column 2 gives the number of workers won relative tothe
work force. These data show that union success in representation elections
has declined to the point where virtually no workers are organized through
NLRBprocedures.Whereas in the early 1950s unions organized 1 percent to 2
percent of the work force via government-sponsoredelections, in the 1960s
they organized about .7 percent; in the 1970s, about .5 percent;and in
1983, just .1 percent: 91,000 workers in a work force of some 90million!
Even these figures, moreover, understate union inability to gain members
through NLRBelectionsin the 1980s for a union electoral victory does not
guarantee that workers will obtain a collective bargainingcontract. In
recent years, in fact, workers voting to unionize failed to gain a contract
approximately a third of the time (Weiler, 1985), and thusworked under
management-determined rather collectively bargaining conditons. The
implication is that in 1983 perhaps only 60,000 workers gainedunion
representation through the electoral process. When account istaken of the
25,000 or so workers who chose to decertify unions in elections (NLRB,
table13), it is apparent that the legally established mode of organizing
labor in the private sector of the U.S. has run dry for trade unions.— 18—
EXHIBiT5: OrganizjflQ Success of Unions Through NLRBElections
Workers Workers Won! Z of Eli9 in Eli9 Workers!
Won Nonar Emp Union Wins Nonagr E!L
(in thousands)
1950 754 2.0 84 2.4
1955 343 1.0 73 1.4
1960 286 .7 59 1.2
1965 316 .7 61 1.1
1970 301 .6 52 1.2
1975 204 .4 38 1.1
1980 173 .2 37 .5
1983 91 .1 43 .3
Source: NLRB Annual Reports.— 19—
Columns3 and 4 of exhibit 5 decompose the number of workers won by
unions in representation elections relative to the work forceinto: a
measure of the union success rate --thenumber of workers in elections won
by unions relative to the number of workers eligible to vote(column 3);
and a measure of the extent of electoral activity -.thenumber of workers
(column 4).
eligible to vote in elections relative to the work force AThefigures in
column 3 show that one factor in the decline in workers organized through
representation elections has been a fall in the proportionof workers in
elections won by unions (which reflects declines in union win ratesand in
the average size of union victories.)10 The figures in column4 show,
however, an even greater proportionate drop in the extentof electoral
activity: in 1960 some 6000 NLRB elections covered 1.2 percentof the work
force; in 1983 4400 elections covered a bare .3 percent of thework force.
Had unions won all of these elections they would not have gained enough
members to increase density.
Turning to the public sector, there are good reasons tobelieve that
both terms in our equation for union density -- thenet depreciation of
existing density (-(r+g)] and success in organizing new workers --playeda
role in the speed with which unionisation and/or collective bargaining
representation grew in the 1970s and 1980s. First, because few government
departments, union or nonunion, go out of business, thatthe loss of
density due to closure of union workplaces (reflected in r)will be small.
Second, the relatively moderate growth of public sector employmentinto new
areas implies that existing unions do not to have to appeal toworkers
outside their traditional jurisidictions to maintain their shareof
employment, which also should make r+g smaller in the publicthan in the
private sector, so that any given organizing effort willmaintain a larger- 20-
uniondensity. Third, organizing workers into unions has undoubtedly been
much easier in the public sector.In part this is because many workers
have been historically organized into employee associations, whichwere
readily transformed into unions without a massive organizing campaign.
More importantly, however, organization is easier in the publicsector
because politicians and public sector managers do not contest unionization
to the extent that private employers do, for reasons to be laid out
shortly.Finally, state laws that require employers to negotiate and
mandate impasse procedures guarantee that workers who vote union ultimately
receive union representation. Hence, in the public sector, once workers
choose union representation, they get what they choose.
With this and the information in the preceding section as background,
let us now turn to proposed explanations for the changed uniondensity.
III. Potential Causes of Change
"It's rather hard to understand ... Somehowit seems to fill my head with
ideas --onlyI don't know exactly what they are! However, somebody killed
something: that's clear, at any rate."
Alice, as reported by Lewis Carroll.
Researchers have proposed a wide variety of factors to explain the
changes in unionization in the U.S. Among the hypothesized causes for the
decline in private sector density are: structural shifts in the composition
of the work force and mix of jobs; changes in public attitudes toward
unions reflected in opinion polls; increased governmental regulation of the
labor market substituting for union protection; "positive labor relations"
by nonunion firms; the performance of unions in representing workers and— 21—
allocatingresources to organizing drives; anti-union policiesof the
Reagan administration evinced in theair traffic controllers strike and
selection of members to the NLRB; anti-union campaigns by managements.
Among the factors said to cause the spurtin public sector unionism
are: extension of NLRAtypelaws to public sector workers in many states;
extension of some union rights to federal workers byexecutive order;
pent-up demand for unions byworkers whose organizational level was
exceptionally low by U.S. and world standards.
By examining the impact of factors onthe changes in the private and
public sectors at once, and requiring thatthe factors have a consistent
effect, I eliminate some hypotheses and highlight therole of others.
Structural Changes
Because the proportion of the work force in traditionallynonunion
occupations(whitecollar),demographic groups(females,college
graduates), industries (service, trade, etc.) and regions(the South) has
increased rapidly, various analysts have explored the possibilitythat the
changing structure of the work force underlies the dropin union density.
The tool for this exploration is a fixed coefficient model which decomposes
the workforce into a number of groups with varying degrees ofunionization
at some base time, and explores the impact of changes inthe relative size
of the groups on aggregate unioni density under the assumptionthat the
density of each group is fixed at its level.
Fixed coefficient analyses covering the 1960s through 1980attribute
50 percent to 70 percent of the decline in private sector union densityto
compositional factors (Dickens and Leonard, 1985), withthe increase in
white collar employment having a particularly sizeable depressanteffect on— 22—
density.While these calculations would appear to go far toward explaining
the decline in unionization, I believe the structuralist analysis is mis-
leading and should be rejected. There are three reasons for rejecting it.
First, the structuralist hypothesis is inconsistent with the rise in
union density in other countries (notably Canada) which had structural
changes in the work force similar to those in the United States. Second,
surveys of worker desire for unionism show that structural changes cannot
explain the decline in union success in NLRB elections, since thegroups
whose proportion of the work force increased (such as women andyoung
workers) have as great or greater desire to unionize as do white prime-age
male workers (Freeniand and Medoff, 1984,p. 228). Third, I reject the
structuralist hypothesis because it assumes that the union share of workers
in a sector should remain fixed over time. That assumption is inconsistent
with the history of union growth, which is one of expansion into nonunion
areas, as occurred in the public sector in the period under study. The
claim that public sector workers organized because ofpent-up demand for
unionization, indeed, implies that unionism "naturally"grows in new
sectors over time. Fixed coefficient calculations sidestep the key issue in
the decline in U.S. unionjsatjon, which is why unions failedto organize
historically nonunion workers in the private sector while doing so in the
public sector and in other countries.
Public Opinion Toward Unions
The decrease in favorable attitudes toward unions shown in public
opinion polls offers another possible explanation for the decline of
unionism in the private sector (Lipset, 1986). While public opinion data
should not be dismissed out of hand, I do not find this hypothesis
persuasive. The timing of the change in opinions and union density are— 23—
weaklyrelated, with public support of unions as measured bythe Gallup
Poll climbing from 62 percent in 1949 to 75 percent in 1953, falling to64
percent in 1962, rising to 70 percent in 1965, fallingto 55 percent in
1981, and rebounding slightly to 58 percent in 1985. Publicfavorableness
toward unions was 59 percent in 1973 and 58 percent in 1985, but union
density fell sharply during that time. More damaging tothis thesis,
perhaps, are responses to the behaviorally more meaningfulquestion of
whether workers would vote for a union at their work place, whichshow no
decline in worker desire for unions: in both 1977 and 1984 about athird of
nonunion workers said they wanted unions at theirworkplace.11 Finally, a
public opinion explanation of union decline isinconsistent with
unionization of the public sector, where public opinion could be expected
to be especially important.
Substitutes for Union Protection
Workers join unions for protection against unfair treatment, including
low wages, by management. This motivation suggests that the development of
substitute modes of protection in the form of welfare state interventions
in markets (Neumann and Rissman, 1984) or of better personnel practices by
management might reduce worker desire for union representation.If
government activities substitute for union protection onewould expect:
unionism to decline most in countries with the greatest welfare state and
restrictions on management, in American states with extensive protective
labor legislation, and in periods of declining governmental interventions,
as in the 1980s. Further, unions should appeal least toworkers who enjoy
special legal protections, such as blacks, women, and publicsector
employees protected by civil service rules. Changes inunion density by
country, by states, and over time, and the desirefor unions by blacks,— 24—
-women,and public sector workers are uniformly inconsistent with these
implications (Freeman, 1986). Hence, I reject the view that governmental
tegulations and growth of the welfare state underlie the decline in
Jaensity.
The possibility that "positive labor relations" practicesadopted by
any major companies (but too expensive for smaller ones) -- payingunion
evel wages and instituting union-style personnel practices suchas
eniority, job bidding and posting, grievance systems (Foulkes, 1980) --
iasreduced worker desires for unions at these workplaces finds better
zupport in the data. Studies of organizing drives show that companies with
zood personnel practices are more successful than others indefeating
nions (AFL-CIO, 1984; Kochan, McKersie, and Chalykoff, 1986),although the
_argest effect of such practices must be in deterring drives in the first
iace. The increased wage premium associated with size of establishment in
ne l970s (Brown and Medoff), which could be expected to make unionization
ess attractive to those workers, is, moreover, consistent with the
eclining success of unionsin NLRBelectionsinvolving large
stablishments.12 Still, I doubt thatpositive labor relations can explain
uch of the overall decline in union density. Large employers account fora
ecreasing share of jobs in the U.S. and unions could increase density
T.:reatly without organizing the IBMs of the world.
overpmen Industrial Relations Policies
Government industrial relations policies have been cited as causing
_iions to decline in the private sector and to expand in the public sector.
:rtheprivate sector, some blame (credit) the Reagan Administration's
—--eratjon of the NLRBanddestruction of the Professional Air Traffic— 25—
ControllersOrganization (PATCO) as inducing an anti-union climatein the
business community. The fact that union density began falling in the
private sector before the Reagan Administration and thatcollective
bargaining coverage has increased in the public sector duringthe 1980s
would seem to rule out this hypothesis, though it is possible that
administration actions may have contributed to the acceleration of the
decline in the l980s.
The argument that state policies toward unionism have played a major
role in the expansion of collective bargaining in the public sector has, on
the other hand, considerable research support. Numerous studies have found
that public sector unionization and collective bargaining contracts are
more likely in states with favorable labor laws than in other states
(Freeman, 1986). Other studies --perhapsmore persuasive --haveshown
that unionism has spurted in cities following passage of favorable laws
(Ichniowski, forthcoming; Saltzman, 1985, forthcoming).Even within a
city, departments for whom state laws are more favorable toward collective
bargaining end up with contracts more frequently than "brother" departments
operating under less favorable state law (Freeman and Valletta,
forthcoming). At the minimum, we have an empirical regularity: public
sector collective bargaining coverage and union density increase markedly
in the presence of laws favorable to collective bargaining. This finding
raises, however, two further questions: why comparable laws induce
different outcomes between the public and private sectors, with which I
will deal in detail shortly, and why many states enacted laws favorable to
unions while "labor law reform" failed at the national level, which I
believe is due in part to the simple fact that a minority of senators,
representing states that are unfavorably disposed to unionism, can stop— 26—
nationallegislation but cannot, course, undo legislation in states that
are favorably disposed to unionism.
Union Performance
Union performance may have contributed to the decline inunion density
in three ways. First, unionsmay have represented members poorly,
discouraging nonunion workers from organizing. This hypothesis haslittle
empirical support; it is inconsistent with unionsuccess in obtaining wage
and benefit increases exceeding those of otherworkers in the l970s and
with opinion poll data showing union membersto be reasonably satisfied
with their unions (Kochan, 1979). Second, unionsmay have failed to
allocate sufficient resources toorganizing activity in the l9GOs and
1970s. This claim has some a priorivalidity, as organizing expenditures
deflated by wages (organizing is labor-intensive) havefailed to keep pace
with the growth of the increasingly nonunionlabor force and have been
concentrated in sectors in which unions werealready strong rather than in
new and growing industries (Paula Voos, 1985, 1986). Becausedecisions to
allocate resources to organizingdepend in part on the organizing
environment and the perceived benefits and costs oforganizing campaigns,
however, I am leery of attributing a largeindependent role to union
organizing efforts. Union failure to embark on majororganizing campaigns
may simply reflect rational responses to the low expected successrates.
Third, and paradoxically from the perspective ofanalyses that treat
unionization as a worker decision, the success of unionsin raising union
wage premiums in the 1970s may have contributed to the decline indensity
by raising the cost of unionization to firms andthereby intensifying the
anti-union activity of management -- towhich I turn next.— 27—
AggressiveAnti-Union Management
Given that the NLRB electoral process allows managementto influence
results, and that management is likely to prefer to operatenonunion, it is
logical to seek an explanation for decliningunion success in the behavior
of management. Did anti-union activity by managementincrease in the
private sector in the period studied?How have public sector managers
behaved?
Exhibit 6shows graphically that one Indicatorof management
anti-union activity -- "unfair"labor practices under the law -- has
skyrocketed. While the NLRBdatain the exhibit measure charges of unfair
activity rather than actions found illegalin court (raising the
possibility that unions may simply be filing moreunfair charges), the
proportion of charges upheld has been roughlyconstant at 30 to 40 percent
over time (Weiler, 1983), and NLRB statistics onnumbers of workers
discharged for union activity and orderedreinstated by the NLRB and courts
show increases comparable to those in the figure. Asfor legal management
opposition, a Conference Board survey revealsthat 45 percent of firms in
their Personnel Practices Forum had operating union free as alabor policy
goal in 1983 compared to 31 percent in 1977, indicatingthat even over a
short period management opposition to unionization has grownsubstantially
(Kochan, McKersie and Chalykoff, 1986).
In the public sector, by contrast, there has been nooutburst of
anti-union activity by management. Charges of unfairlabor practices
concern interpretation of state bargaining laws -- whethera particular
topic Is subject to collective bargaining or is a managementprerogative --
notto the existence of unionism per se. Public sector managersrarely hire













EXHIBIT6: Indices of Change of Unfair Labor Practices
Against Management and NLRB Elections (16 =100)
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ofchanges in state laws, moreover, the trend inthe public sector is
toward less rather than more management opposition tocollective
bargaining.
On the basis of these facts, I argue that the anti-union management
offensive in the private sector is the key to de-unionization of the United
States, and that its absence from the public sector explainsthe successful
organization of public employees. Moreover, I claim that thedifferential
behavior of management in the public and private sectors is explicable by
the incentives facing them.
IV. Management Offensive, Union Wage Prernia, and Cost of Opposition
My proposed explanation can be most easily representedwith a simple
schematic model (see Exhibit 7), which diverges from many models of union
organization by stressing the role of management in unionization andthe
endogeneity of both management opposition and union organizing. I postulate
three basic relations.
The first relation is a 'production function' for organizing success.
It relates the number of workers newly organized relative to the labor
force to the resources devoted by management to opposing unions, the
resources devoted by unions to organizing, and a vector of all other
factors that might influence the outcome.
The second relation links the resources management devotes to opposing
unionization to economic factors likely to affect the profitability of such
activity.One such factor is the union wage premium, which is assumed to
reduce profits and increase management opposition. Another is the cost of
opposing unionism in an NLRB election, which will depend onthe— 30—
Exhibit7 Deterainants of Union OrQanizlnQ Activityand






where PC NEW=number ofworkers organizeciJia force;
MAN—resourc devoted bymanagement to opposing unions;
ORG—resources devoted by unionsto organizing;
X=other factors that influenceoutcomes
Management Opposition:MAN=g(WAGEPREMCOSTOR0y)
where WAGEpJM=0wage premiums
COST=cost of opposing union inNLR.B elections;
Yother relevant factors,largely relating to product market
factors such as deregulation ofindustries, etc., which
detetmine affect of unionisnon profitability.
Union and WorkerOrganizing Effort: ORG=h(WAGEPREMJ.JUDENSZ)
where tJDENSumondensity at the beginning of the period;
Z=other relevant factors,largely relating to labor market.— 31—
"technology"of battling unions at workplaces, which has changed greatly in
the past fifteen years due to the advent of labor-managementconsultants
who specialize in training supervisors to pressure workers to opposeunions
and in running anti-union propaganda campaigns; and on the legal penalty
for committing unfair labor practices. In the private sectorthe legal
penalty is minuscule: the law requires that managementreinstate workers
unjustly fired for union activity, pay the workersback pay less whatever
income they earned in the period, and post a notice that the firmwill not
engage in such illegal activity again. However,reinstating workers often
occurs only after the representation election and manychoose not to
return. Posting a notice about past illegal activity onthe part of the
firm which often has the effect of warning workers how far managementis
willing to go to defeat unions rather than convincing themthat management
will forego such tactics in the future.Finally, the management decision
is also assumed to depend on the resources the union devotes to organizing,
and, on other unspecified factors, largely relating to productmarket
conditions, that can be expected to make anticipated union wage premiums
more or less expensive in terms of lost profits.
The third relationship in my analysis links union (and worker)
organizing activity to:the wage premium, presumed to raise the
attractiveness of unions to workers and thus increase organizing activity;
the existing density of union workers, with a lower density assumed to
reduce organizing activity because the cost of organizing eachnonunion
worker is higher to existing union members when there are proportionately
fewer unionists among whom to spread the cost; the amount of resources
management devotes to opposing unionism; and a catch-allvector of other
relevant factors, largely relating to labor market conditions.— 32—
Oneimportant feature of this model is that the unionwage premium
affects the decisions of both themanagement and union (workers). In the
management equation, a higher premium induces more anti-union activity and
thus reduces union organizing success.In the union equation, a higher
premium induces additional organizing activity and thus raisesunion v ucLe95.
Givenopposing tendencies, is the wage premium likely to bepositively or
negatively correlated with actual outcomes?To the extent that unions
extract rents from finns through monopolywage increases, the money loss to
finns will exceed the transfer to workers(due to the 'triangle'
inefficiency), giving management a potential incentive tospend more
resources to prevent unionisatjon than unions/workersspend to organize
(Freeman, 1986b).If expenditures by the two sides have equal effectson
outcomes, higher union wage premium will reduce organizing success.
A second important feature of the model is the inclusion ofmanagement
and union activity in the equationsdetermining the behavior of the other
side. This highlights the interactive nature of theorganizing struggle--
which can be viewed as a twoperson (three person, if one distinguishes
workers at an organizing cite from the union)game -- andthus directs
attention to the potential payoff from game-theoreticanalyses of union and
management strategic behavior that goes beyond the scope of thisessay.
A third aspect of the analysis that deserves attentionis the
inclusion of union density in the equation for unionorganizing activity,
for it raises the possibility that a fall in uniondensity will produce a
cumulative decline, as the increased cost oforganizing induces unions to
lower organizing activity, while,conversely, rises in union density will
have the opposite cumulative effect.
How might one use the model embedded in theserelationships to explain— 33—
thedecline in private sector union density?
The most reasonable hypothesis1 given
the evidence in section III, is
that management opposition to unionism,
induced by changes in the cost of
unionization and the union wage premium,reduced union organizing success,
with cumulative effects on union densityand organizing effort. For this
explanation to be valid, it is necessarythat management activity have an
important impact on organizing success;and that this activity respond to
economic incentives.
With respect to the effectiveness of managementopposition, studies by
a diverse set of researchers rangingfrom management groups to the General
Accounting Office to the AFL-CIO toacademics all find that management
activity reduces union successin NLRB representation elections and
organizing drives (see Exhibit 8).The sole exception (Getman, Goldberg,
and Herman) has been the subject ofconsiderable controversy, with Dickens
convincingly reversing their conclusionin a re-analysis of the underlying
data. Even absent this, however, the preponderanceof the evidence is that
the extent of management oposition substantially
determineS the outcomes
of organizing carnpaigns, as posited. As managementdevotes considerable
resources to opposing unionization,and presumably acts rationally, this
makes intuitive sense.
Because the studies in Exhibit 8 focus onrepresentation elections!
organizing drives, rather than onthe workers gained relative to thework
force (PCTNEW) that enters the union density equation,and do not provide
estimates of the extent to which the downwardtrend in union success can be
attributed to management opposition,I have estimated the impact of the
one indicator of management oppositionfor which time series data exists --
unfairlabor practices -- onworkers won by unions as a share of nonagricu-— 34—
Exhibit8: Summary of Studies Of Effects of Management Activity
on NLRB Representjn Election Resu1t
Measurement of Does Activity
Study and Sample Mar'.a;ement Activity Has Effect?
1. National Industrial conference Amount of communication Yes
Board, 140 union organising drives by management
of white collar workers, 1966—67
2. AFL—CIO, 495 NLRB election, Amount of oppostion Yes
1966—67 by management
3. Prosten, analysiss of probability Amount of time delay Yes
of union win in 130,701 electionsbetween eleciton and
in 1962—77 petion
4. Lawler, 155 NLRB elections, 1974—78 Company hires consultant Yes
5. Drotning, 41 elections ordered Amount of Communication Yes
void and rerun by NLRB by management
6. Roomkjn—Block, 45155 union Delay between petition Yes
representation cases, 1971—77 and election
7. Seeber and Cooke, proportion Employers object to Yes
of workers voting for union election district
representation by state, 1970—78
8. US General Accounting Office, Employer committed Yes
analysis of 8(a)(3) illegal unfair labor practice
firings or other discrirrination
for union involvement in 368
representation elections
9. Aspin study of 71 NLRB elections Employer fired worker Yes, unless
in which reinstatements were for union activity reinstated
ordered, before elect
10. Getman, Goldberg, and Herren Campaign tactics Not stat
analysis of 1293 workers in 31 employer. sigr;ificant
elections in 1972—73
11. Dickens study of 966 workers Legal and illegal Yes
in 31 elections in 1972—73 campaign tactics
(using data set in #10) by employer
12. Catler, study of 817 NLRE Unfair labor practices Yes
elections and delay
13. Kochan, McKersie and Chalykoff, Employer emphasizes union Yes
225 firms, avoidance strategy— 35—
ituralemployment. My analysis uses pooled state (industry)time series
data, with time dummies included to control for omittedtrend and cyclical
factors and state/industry dummies to control for omitted state (industry)
effects, and diverse control variables. The results, summarizedin Exhibit
9, show that unfair labor practices reduce the numbersunionized relative
to the work force and that the trend in unfair labor practices can account
for roughly half of the observed drop in that outcome measure. Tothe
extent that unfair practices substitute for lawful managementanti-union
activity, this estimate, while sizeable, understatesthe full impact of
management's fight against unions. Alternatively, however,if the growth
of unfair practices is positively correlated with the growth of legal
managment opposition, my estimates overstatethe impact of illegal
management activity on the decline in union success, thoughthey may
accurately measure the impact of management opposition, in total.
The role of changes in the relative cost of union deterrence in
stimulating the management offensive has not been the subjectof extensive
research,making conclusions here morespeculative.Time series
calculations show that some of the rise in unfair practices is explicable
by the rise in union wage premiums in the 1970s, but the seriesis short
and the measures are crude (Freeman 198Gb). Estimates of the relation
between decline of union density and union premiums at a one-digit industry
level indicate that where the premium has risen most, union declines have
been greatest (Linneman and Wachter), which may reflect reduced organizing
success or a greater death rate for union plants in those sectors.As for
other factors likely to raise the cost of unionism to firms, it is highly
plausible that such product market developments as the growthof foreign
competition and deregulation have made existing union wages more expensive— 36 —
Exhibit 9: Ectisates of the EffpctofManappeentUnfair
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interms of lost profits. As increased nonunion competitionand management
policies against unionised firms in construction indicates,however, new
product market competition from any source, notsimply trade or
deregulation, can significantly reduce union density. Finally, with
respect to the determination of union organizingefforts, the major work
here -- byPaula Voos -- suggeststhat one can treat organizing behavior
as rational decision-making.
Is this analysis consistent with the increase in public sector
density?
There are three basic facts to explain regarding the spreadof
collective bargaining to the public sector: the geographic variationin
unionization associated with different labor laws; the spurt in unioniz-
ation that followed passage of the laws; and the different behaviorof
public than of private sector managers under comparablelaws. If the
benefits to management of operating with a union relative to the cost of
opposing unions are lower in the public than in the private sector,and
those costs have decreased over time, we could account for these facts in
the same framework used to explain developments in the private sector: in
terms of the incentives and options for management to oppose unions.
In fact, the incentives for management to oppose unions do appear to
be lower in the public sector. First, public sector workers constitute an
especially active political group able to punish or reward the politicians
who are their employers at the ballot box, even though they are only a
small proportion of voters in most areas. Second, the cost of illegal
opposition is likely to be greater for public than for privateofficials,
as public officials who break laws are likely to face possibleremoval from
office. Third, unions can help public sector employers increase budgets— 38—
throughlobbying for additional public expenditures, creating a greater
jointness of interest than in the private sector. Fourth,wage premiums
tend to be smaller in the public sector (see Lewis,forthcoming; Freeman,
1986). Put crudely, management opposition to unions can gain profits in the
private sector; in the public sector it can cost votes. Given this, and the
fact that states passed laws favorable to unionization in thel960s and
1970s that increased the cost ofmanagement opposition in the public
sector, the spurt of unions there is consistent with the model.
Finally, is this analysis consistent with the differential experience
of Canada? While private sectormanagers are likely to have similar profit
incentives to oppose unions in Canada as in the United States(there is no
evidence that union wage effects are smaller in Canada than in theU.S.
Anderson and Gunderson), the Canadian system fororganizing workers differs
from the American system by givingmanagement less option to express
opposition. Canadian labor boards rely largely on "card checks" in which
unions sign up workers to determine representation ata work place rather
than on adversarial elections and impose harsherpenalties on managements
that break the laws (Weiler, 1983; Meltz), with the result thatCanada has
not eexperienced anything like the massive outburst ofmanagement unfair
labor practices that characterizes U.S. labor relations. The differencein
institutional procedures highlights the fact that the decline inprivate
sector unionism in the U.S. required two factors: increased incentive for
management to oppose unions, and the opportunity to turn that incentive
into action.— 39—
Conclusion
As the reader will undoubtedly have observed, notall the pieces for a
complete explanation of the decline in privatesector union density and rise
in public sector density in the United States arein place. But the avail-
able evidence seems consistent with an explanationfor private sector de-
cline that stresses increased management oppositionto union organization,
motivated in part by profit—seeking behavior, and augmented bytrade union
responses; and an explanationof growth in the public sector that stresses
reduced management opposition due to passage of comprehensivecollective bar-
gaining laws and motivated in part byvote—seeking behavior.
As for the likely impact of the change inunionization on the perfor-
mance of the economy, two points areworth attention. The first is that the
increasingly public sector locus of Aniericanunionism is likely to produce
different union effects and modes of operationthan have been found for the
traditionally private sector union movement.Public sector unions have, for
example, smaller wage effects and strike ratesthan private sector unions and
appear to increase rather thanreduce employment in union activities (see
Freeman and Ichniowski, forthcoming). Second,without making any judgment
of whether a less unionized private sectorwill perform better or not, one
thing should be perfectly clear: analystswho have attributed national econo—
miC problems ranging from unemployment to wageinflation to low productivity
to unions will have to find a new culpritto blame: unless there is a remark-
able renaissance in unionism, criticswon't have unions to kick around any
more.— 40—
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ENDNOTES
1.The Meany quote is given in LeoKramer,Labor's Paradox--the American
Federation of State. Council and MunicipalEmployees, 1962, p.14.
2. Estimates of organization in the publicsector differ somewhat among
sources, though all data show greater organization than in the private
sector. See Freeman, Ichniowski, and Zax (forthcoming) fora detailed
analysis of the various statistics.
3. U.S. employment data come from two basicsources: Current Population
Surveydata onindividuals and establishment data from the Bureau of Labor
Statistics. The 85 percent figures comes from the establishmentsurvey.
4.These data are from the Survey of Governments, which differfrom those in
the Current Population Survey, as described inFreeman, Ichniowski and Zax
(forthcoming).
5. Millvard and Stevens (1986)report a rise in the percentage of
manufacturingestablishments operating nonunion from 18percent to 29
percent (pp. 58-59) and a drop in the percentage with a closed shop from 30
percent to 18 percent (p. 103).
6. This is not to say that unions throughout the Westdo not face serious
problems in adjusting to the changing economic climate.They do. The
difference between the United States and most othercountries is that only
in the United States have these problems taken theform of massive
dc-unionization of the private sector.
7.That is, situations where a union triesto pressure an employer by
placing economic pressure on a third party, for instancea customer or
supplier
8. The changes in laws are reviewed in Freeman(1986) and in Valletta and
Freeman (forthcoming) in greater detail. The NBER hasa computer file on
regulations across states, departments, and time, which is availableto
researchers on request.
9. These estimates are based on the privatesector union membership numbers
of Troy and Sheflin for 1950, 1960, 1970,1980, and a projected 1985 figure
based on his 1983 (updated using CPS figureson the percentage change in
membership from 1983 to 1985); estimates of private nonagriculturalwage
and salary workers exclusive of private household workers from the ELS;— 47—
andthe numberofmembers won by unions in NLRB elections in
1951-1960, 1961-1970, 1971-1980, 1981-1985 (with 1984 and 1985 assumed to
be the same as 1983). I calculated the compound annual rate of
depreciation in union membership by comparing actual membership in, say
1980, with membership in 1970 plus the number of workers won from
1971-1980, and then subtracted the compound annual rate of growth of the
relevant employment.
10. One can use various identities to decompose the decline in members
won/employment (Freeman, 1985).
11. The figures for 1977 are from the Quality of Employment Survey. Those
for 1985 are from the Harris Poll.
12. In the l9SOs unions had a better record in large units than in smaller
ones, but this ptern of success was reversed in the l970s.The small
number of elections in large units in recent years makes the 1980s figures
spotty. For data on union win rates by size of unit, see Goldfield,1987.